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Abstract—This paper proposes a simulation-based methodol-
ogy for evaluating the effectiveness of various regulatory frame-
works promoting the large-scale deployment of decentralised
electricity generation resources (DERs) in distribution systems.
Electricity consumers, prosumers, and the distribution system
operator (DSO) are modelled as agents interacting with each
other in an artificial environment which encapsulates the salient
features of realistic regulatory frameworks, along with a set
of assumptions on DER technology availability, performance,
and costs. More precisely, the methodology enables to simulate
the interactions between those agents in a great variety of
environments in order to study the progressive deployment of
DER as a function of its profitability, and also shows how this
deployment impacts the remuneration mechanism of the DSO
and the evolution of the distribution tariff. The methodology is
illustrated on a case study considering 16 different regulatory
environments and using data for Belgian DSOs.
Index Terms—distribution system operator, distributed gener-
ation, tariffication, regulation, agent-based modelling
I. INTRODUCTION
The energy transition process, globally driven by proactive
policy making, seeks to progressively push forward a regime
shift in the power generation sector from fossil fuels to
renewable energy sources [1]. The integration of decentralised
electricity generation resources (DER) has been deemed a key
enabler of a seamless energy transition and is promoted by
means of various incentive mechanisms [2]. These incentive
mechanisms, nonetheless, might have been implemented with-
out an adequate understanding of their potential adverse effects
on the electricity distribution sector: indeed, since the distribu-
tion networks (DNs) are not technically and administratively
designed to absorb large amounts of distributed generation [3],
the incorporation of DER may cause severe technical [4] and
regulatory problems [5]. This paper proposes a methodology to
anticipate the regulatory challenges created by the integration
of residential DER, mainly composed of solar photovoltaic
(PV) units and/or batteries, into the electricity mix. Assuming
that a constant cost of the distribution system operator (DSO)
must be recovered through the distribution charges to residen-
tial consumers, we investigate how business models exploiting
behind-the-meter devices to reduce electricity bills impact the
remuneration mechanisms of DSOs.
Previous studies on the topic suggest that, under certain
regulatory frameworks, the deployment of DER as, for in-
stance household PV units, may be responsible for an increase
in the distribution component of the overall retail price of
electricity (the latter typically including energy generation
costs, transmission costs, distribution costs, and taxes) [6]–
[8]. Furthermore, the authors in [9] show that, in a setting
where the distribution charges to the consumers are pre-
dominantly volumetric (e/kWh), and where a net-metering
incentive mechanism is in place, an increase in the distribution
tariff leads to a corresponding increase in household PV
deployment. The combination of those effects can result in
a potentially DN-disrupting phenomenon known as the death
spiral of the utility [10], which takes place in two stages:
(1) distribution tariffs increase due to the deployment of
DER (DSOs struggle to recover their costs and must see
the distribution tariffs increase), and (2) higher distribution
tariffs induce the proliferation of DER installations. Should
this phenomenon proceed unchecked for some time, an uncon-
trolled increase in distribution tariffs may appear, in which the
extra financial burden resulting from higher tariffs is mostly
incurred by the users who have not deployed DER, and who
are thus more exposed to price fluctuations [6]. To cope
with this phenomenon, a common strategy suggested by some
authors involves resorting to different regulatory frameworks
that better reflect the costs of providing the distribution service,
and which induce electricity rates that serve as efficient signals
for the users of the DN [11].
When creating novel regulatory frameworks, it is crucial to
be able to identify potential pitfalls, notably by testing them
under various technological and regulatory assumptions. In
view of this, the main goal of this paper is the development of
a methodology that enables both simulating and exploring the
impact of a given regulatory framework on the evolution of
DNs over time. Our methodology is based on modelling the
interactions between consumers, prosumers, and the DSO as a
multi-agent dynamical system. At every time-step, these agents
can perform actions: the consumers may deploy DER instal-
lations aiming at minimising their electricity bills, whereas
the DSO may adjust the distribution tariff in order to collect
sufficient revenues so as to break-even. To demonstrate the
wide applicability of the simulator, we ran an extensive battery
of tests, covering the most commonly employed regulatory
practices. To create cost-reflective regulatory frameworks, two
main trends can be found in the literature: (i) using distri-
bution tariffs based (at least partially) on capacity and on
fixed payments which are more cost-reflective than volumetric
tariffs [11]–[13], and (ii) using incentive mechanisms sending
efficient price signals to the consumers, e.g. shifting from net-
metering (NM) to net-billing (NB) [6], [14]. We have selected
the tests showcasing the functioning of our simulator on the
basis of these two trends.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II provides an
introductory overview of the simulator. Section III details
the mathematical model underpinning the simulator. Section
IV proposes an extensive illustration of the methodology
considering various regulatory frameworks. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. SIMULATOR OVERVIEW
The proposed methodology relies on a multi-agent system
formalisation in which the agents (i.e. consumers, potential
prosumers, actual prosumers, and DSO) interact with each
other, within a given technological and regulatory framework.
Accordingly, every potential prosumer of a unique DN is
modelled as an agent who is eligible to deploy an optimally
sized DER installation, turning them into actual prosumers.
The decision to deploy such an installation depends on its
cost-efficiency when compared to the retail price of electricity.
Concerning the DSO, this agent is entitled to adjust the
distribution tariff in order to recover its costs of providing
the distribution service. Finally, the set of rules characterising
a given technical and regulatory framework is embedded in
what we define as an environment. When interacting within
an environment, the agents make the DN evolve. Such an
evolution may iteratively modify the future actions of the
agents. The inputs of the simulator are the agents of the DN
and the environment. A flow diagram of our simulator can be
found in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Flow diagram of the proposed multi-agent simulator. Every po-
tential prosumer performs an optimisation (OPT ), which is followed by
a (probabilistic) investment decision process (IDP ). The IDP may yield
either a positive or a negative result, defining the transition from potential to
actual prosumer. Finally, the DSO adjusts the distribution tariff through its
remuneration mechanism RM .
The simulation starts with a pool of potential prosumers
who may become actual prosumers during the simulation. In
addition, there is a proportion of users who cannot become
prosumers owing to technical or economic constraints, the
consumers, and who are modelled through their demand (resid-
ual demand). For every potential prosumer (PPi), a potential
optimised DER installation is computed (OPT ) aiming at
minimising the apparent cost of electricity to the actual pro-
sumers (i.e. apparent comes from cost minus revenue). Then,
a given potential prosumer may become an actual prosumer
(APi) through a (probabilistic) investment decision process
(IDP ). The DSO, through its remuneration mechanism (RM ),
collects charges from the use of the grid of the three types of
user (consumers, potential prosumers, and actual prosumers),
and adjusts the distribution tariff so that it recovers its costs.
Iterating this process over a given horizon (or until all potential
prosumers have turned into actual prosumers), provides an
estimation of the evolution of the DN.
III. SIMULATOR FORMALISATION
In this section the agents, their interaction mechanisms, as
well as the notion of environment, are formalised.
A. Modelling the environment
A real environment includes many rules, which may not all
be relevant to our modelling. Against this backdrop, to create
our environments, we identified and selected a subset of rules
capturing key drivers for DER deployment: (i) tariff design,
(ii) incentive mechanism, and (iii) technology costs.
Tariff design: this rule defines the structure of the distribu-
tion costs charged to the users of the DN. On that account, the
distribution fees might be based on volume of energy drawn
from the grid, charged in e/kWh. Additionally, these fees can
depend on drawn power; in this case the fee is based on the
contracted capacity of the user, charged in e/kWp. Lastly,
there might be fixed charges as well, which only depend on
the availability of a connection, charged in e. The amount
of money charged by the DSO for its services over a given
billing period is obtained as a weighted sum of those fees,
whose respective proportions are regulated. To design a tariff,
it is possible to use any combination of these fees, provided
that the total costs for the users remains the same.
Incentive mechanism: there are different ways to incentivise
potential prosumers to deploy DER. In this paper we consider
a commonly employed strategy: the compensation mechanism.
This mechanism compensates the surplus of electricity pro-
duced by the DER installation, which would have otherwise
been fed into the grid for free, thereby enhancing the busi-
ness model for behind-the-meter DER deployment. There are
typically two types of remunerative compensation mechanism:
NM and NB, mentioned in the previous section.
• NM: consists of one meter that records imports (DER ←
Grid) by running forward and exports (DER → Grid) by
running backward. With NM, both directions are assigned
with the same monetary value, namely the retail price
of electricity. With this mechanism, if exports exceed
imports, the excess is not remunerated;
• NB: consists of two independent meters for imports and
exports, in this setting imports are charged at the retail
price of electricity, and exports are compensated at a
selling price. Note that, in this work, we assume that
no injection fee is considered.
Technology: this rule impacts the technology costs. We
assume the technology costs will linearly decrease over time,
halving every ten years.
B. Modelling the users
They are divided into three groups: (i) consumers, (ii) po-
tential prosumers, and (iii) actual prosumers. The first group is
not explicitly modelled; it comprises users who will not deploy
a DER installation due to economic or technical constraints.
Their aggregated demand (the residual demand of the DN) is
used in the simulation. We define as potential prosumers all
those users who may deploy a DER installation, provided that
the conditions are favourable. At the beginning of the simula-
tion, the potential prosumers simply draw electricity from the
DN. However, over time, the number of potential prosumers
may decrease, as they elect to invest in and progressively
deploy optimally-sized DER installations, effectively turning
into actual prosumers (IDP). The actual prosumers can draw
(import) and inject (export) electricity from and into the DN.
To model the interactions of potential and actual prosumers,
we make use of an optimisation framework instantiated in
the form of a mixed integer linear program (MILP), which
is loosely based on the MILP found in [15]. This MILP aims
at minimising the levelized value of electricity (LVOE) of the
DER installation, which is introduced as an extended version
of the traditional levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). The
main difference between LVOE and LCOE is that, whilst the
latter can only account for the costs incurred by the DER
installation, the former can take into consideration both costs
and revenues (for instance revenues obtained from electricity
sold). Hence, the LVOE indicates the net economic gain of
a potential prosumer if they become actual prosumers, and
enables the computation of the IDP according to the estimated
profitability of a DER installation. The formalisation of both
the MILP and the IDP are presented in this section.
C. MILP formalisation
For every individual potential prosumer, this optimisation
program is used to compute the electricity trades (imports
and exports), the minimised LVOE, and the optimal sizing
configuration of the DER installation, which leads to the min-
imum LVOE. Thus, both sizing and operation are optimised
under a perfect forecast assumption. The optimisation horizon
is set to Y ∈ N years, where Y = {0, . . . , Y − 1}. Each
year is divided into T time-steps. Let T = {0, . . . , T − 1},
where T = 8760 represent a time discretisation of one year
(in hours). The MILP requires several parameters as inputs;
these parameters are constant over the simulation horizon Y
(they do not evolve from year to year). Let G denote a 4-tuple
gathering these inputs:
G = (P,Π, H,U) ∈ G, with (1)
G ⊂ (R2+)× (R5+ × {0, 1})× (R5+)× (R2+)T
where:
• P =
(
P (pv), P (bat)
)
corresponds to the price of PV
modules P (pv) per kWp, and the price of batteries P (bat)
per kWh, at the time the DER installation is deployed.
• Π =
(
Π(ot),Π(sp),Π(vol),Π(cap),Π(fix),Π(M)
)
repre-
sents employed price signals. Π(ot) is the aggregation
of energy and transmission costs, and taxes, in e/kWh.
Π(sp) corresponds to the price at which prosumers sell
the electricity in e/kWh (only under an NB scheme).
Π(vol) is the volumetric term of the distribution tariff
in e/kWh. Π(cap) represents the capacity term of the
distribution tariff in e/kWp. Π(fix) represents a fixed
charge to be paid by every user connected to the DN,
in e. Finally, Π(M) is a binary variable representing
whether the environment imposes NM (Π(M) = 1), or
NB (Π(M) = 0).
• H =
(
η(−), η(+), F (−), F (+), B
)
defines the battery
parameters. η(−) is the charge efficiency. η(+) is the dis-
charge efficiency. F (−) represents the maximum charge
rate. F (+) stands for the maximum discharge rate. Finally
B is the battery lifetime in years (B > 0).
• U =
{(
U
(d)
t , U
(p)
t
)}T−1
t=0
is a time series of pairs
representing the potential prosumer consumption profile(
U
(d)
t
)
t=0...T−1
(in terms of hourly energy consump-
tion), and solar load factor
(
U
(p)
t
)
t=0...T−1
(in %),
respectively.
Let A = {(p, b) |p ∈ [0, p¯] ; b ∈ [0, b¯]} denote the space of
sizing variables containing: PV size (p) in kWp, battery size
(b) in kWh; with p¯, and b¯ being parameters denoting the upper
bounds on PV and battery sizes, respectively. Then, let χ
represent the investment costs, assumed linearly dependent on
the sizing variables A ∈ A.
χ = p · P (pv) + Y
B
· b · P (bat) (2)
The yearly costs incurred by a prosumer are represented by
φy , and computed by means of the following equation:
∀y ∈ Y φy = υy + ψy +my (3)
where υy represents the yearly distribution costs, computed
according to eq. (4). ψy stands for the yearly costs of elec-
tricity not related to distribution costs, e.g. transmission and
energy costs, computed using eq. (5). my are the costs of
operating and maintaining the DER installation; these costs
are computed as in [16], following eq. (6).
∀y ∈ Y υy = ξy ·Π(vol) + γy ·Π(cap) + Π(fix) (4)
∀y ∈ Y ψy = ξy ·Π(ot) (5)
∀y ∈ Y my = 1
200
· p+ 1
100
· b (6)
in these equations, ξy and γy represent the apparent yearly
consumption and the peak demand of a prosumer, respectively.
The apparent yearly consumption is computed as:
∀y ∈ Y
ξy =
{
max
{
0,
∑T−1
t=0
(
ρ
(−)
t − ρ(+)t
)}
if Π(M) = 1,∑T−1
t=0 ρ
(−)
t if Π
(M) = 0
(7)
where ρ(−)t are the hourly imports, and ρ
(+)
t represents the
hourly exports of a prosumer.
The energy balance of the individual prosumer is modelled
through the following equations ∀t ∈ T :
U
(d)
t + ρ
(+)
t + j
(+)
t = kt + ρ
(−)
t + j
(−)
t (8)
kt = p · U (p)t (9)
j
(−)
t ≤ b ·
1
F (−)
(10)
j
(+)
t ≤ b ·
1
F (+)
(11)
j
(−)
t ≤ b¯ · σt (12)
j
(+)
t ≤ b¯ · (1− σt) (13)
soct ≤ b (14)
soct =
 soct−1 −
j
(+)
t
η(+)
+ j
(−)
t · η(−) ∀t ∈ T \ {0},
soc0 = 0 if t = 0
(15)
where kt is the electricity produced by the PV array, j
(−)
t and
j
(+)
t are, respectively, the energy flows into and out of the
battery, soc is the state of charge, and σt is a binary variable
which will take a value of 1 when the battery is in charging
mode, and 0 if it is discharging.
Let LV OE denote the general objective function that
represents the levelized value of electricity. This objective
function is a mapping from (G × A) to R. For a given pair
(G,A) ∈ (G,A), LV OE (G,A) is defined as follows:
LV OE (G,A) =
χ+
∑Y−1
y=0
φy − ζy
(1 + r)y∑Y−1
y=0
∑T−1
t=0 U
(d)
t
(1 + r)y
(16)
where ζy is the revenue of the prosumer from electricity
sales, and r is the discount rate. By subtracting ζy from the
operational costs, we can compute the actual value offered
by the DER installation (LVOE). This term depends on the
incentive mechanism in place. For NM the revenues are always
0, since the prosumer does not sell electricity to the grid, but
rather this is accounted for by the meter running backward;
for NB the revenues are given by the following expression:
∀y ∈ Y ζy =
T−1∑
t=0
ρ
(+)
t ·Π(sp) (17)
D. Modelling the diversity of prosumers
At the heart of the simulator lies a discrete-time dynamical
process computing the evolution of a set of indicators. Let n ∈
N denote the discrete-time variable used to refer to the itera-
tions of this dynamical process, where N = {0, . . . , N − 1},
and N ∈ N is the time horizon. Furthermore, to represent
the diversity of users, we introduce a set of I ∈ N potential
prosumers, with I = {1, . . . , I}. At every iteration n, each
potential prosumer i ∈ I is characterised by a time series
of pairs Ui,n =
{(
U
(d)
i,n,t, U
(p)
i,n,t
)}T−1
t=0
. Therefore, at every
iteration n, and for every user i, we can define:
∀(i, n) ∈ I ×N Gi,n = (Pn,Πi,n, Hn,Ui,n) (18)
where Pn and Hn do not depend on i since they refer
to technology costs and technical characteristics, assumed
identical for all users. Consequently, we define L̂V OEGi,n
as the minimum value of the objective function, subject to the
previous constraints:
L̂V OEGi,n = min
A ∈ A
s.t.(2) − (17)
LV OE (Gi,n, A) (19)
Furthermore, the optimal sizing configuration writes as:
A∗Gi,n ∈ arg min
A ∈ A
s.t.(2) − (17)
LV OE (Gi,n, A) (20)
E. Modelling the investment decision process
From one time step in the simulation horizon to the next,
we compute the transition from potential to actual prosumer.
For each potential prosumer, the L̂V OEGi,n is compared to
the levelized cost without DER (denoted by Λi,n), and the
outcome of this comparison defines whether or not a transition
occurs. Let Jn ⊆ I denote the set of potential prosumers at
time n. Initially, |J0| = |I|. Assuming that prosumers cannot
turn back into consumers, one has ∀n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1},
|Jn| ≤ |Jn−1|. Then, the costs Λi,n are calculated as follows:
∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N ,
Λi,n = Π
(ot)
n + Π
(vol)
n +
γ
(o)
i,n ·Π(cap)i,n + Π(fix)n∑T−1
t=0 U
(d)
i,n,t
(21)
where γ(o)i,n is the original peak demand of the user. Then, a
price ratio Γi,n can be computed as:
∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N Γi,n =
L̂V OEGi,n
Λi,n
(22)
where Λi,n is strictly positive provided that the user has
some demand, and the electricity prices are positive. Γi,n will
therefore adopt a value between 0 and 1, since L̂V OEGi,n
cannot be greater than Λi,n, by design of the optimisation
problem. To establish whether a consumer will decide to
deploy a DER installation, we make use of a Bernoulli random
variable whose parameter pi,n is a function of Γi,n. We assume
that:
∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N ∃fi,n : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] ,
pi,n = fi,n (Γi,n)
(23)
For simplicity, in the following we assume that all the pre-
viously defined mappings fi,n are equal to a unique linear
mapping, given by:
∃α ∈ [0, 1] : ∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N pi,n = α · Γi,n (24)
where α is included to model a broad range of investment
behaviours, e.g. a small value implies a increased tendency
to invest. Then, the random variable βi,n, that controls the
decision of investing or not in a DER installation of size A∗Gi,n ,
is drawn from the Bernoulli distribution B(1, pi,n):
∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N βi,n ∼ B(1, pi,n) (25)
where the decision for every potential prosumer is given by:
∀(i, n) ∈ Jn ×N θi,n = 1− βi,n (26)
with θi,n ∈ {0, 1} by definition of the Bernoulli distribution.
If θi,n = 1, a DER installation of size A∗Gi,n is deployed by
the agent i. This agent is then removed from the set of users
Jn. In this way, when a DER installation of size A∗Gi,n is
deployed, the user i is prevented from investing in the future.
If θi,n = 0, the DER installation is not deployed, and another
opportunity will be given to user i at the following step n+1.
The set Jn+1 can thus be computed as follows:
Jn+1 = Jn \ {i|θi,n = 1} (27)
Modelling the investment decision-making process in such
fashion ensures the deployment of some DER units even when
the viability of the DER installations lie at the economically
feasible limit (for instance when the technology costs are
high or the retail price of electricity is low), representing the
behaviour of those users who are eager to invest. Likewise,
this investment decision-making mechanism will prevent some
agents from investing even under favourable conditions, rep-
resenting those agents more reluctant to invest.
F. Modelling the distribution system operator
The operator distributes electricity to the users of the DN,
charging a distribution fee for the service. This fee must be
sufficiently large so as to collect the revenue that allows the
DSO to break-even financially. Hence, assigning an adequate
level of a distribution fee is a delicate process. An under-
estimated fee may lead to insufficient remuneration, creating
an economic imbalance that must eventually be socialised via
higher rates. On the other hand, an inflated tariff may place
excessive economic strain on users. Both deviations from the
optimum are symptoms of an inefficient regulatory framework.
To model the interactions of the DSO, we represent its
remuneration mechanism, which includes the adjustment of
the distribution fee when needed. Note that the DSO cannot
modify the tariff design or the incentive mechanism, since this
is imposed by the environment.
The remuneration mechanism depends on the (constant)
costs of the DSO (Θn), the revenues of the DSO (Rn), and
the economic imbalance from the previous period (∆n−1).
Initially, the DSO is assumed to be economically balanced
(DSO costs equal to its revenue), therefore ∆−1 = 0. The
general expression to compute the revenue is:
∀n ∈ N Rn = Π(vol)n · (Ω + Ξn)
+ Π(cap)n ·
(I+I0)∑
i=1
γi
+ Π(fix)n · (I + I0)
(28)
where Π(vol)n , Π
(cap)
n , and Π
(fix)
n represent the volumetric,
capacity, and fixed fees, respectively, at the nth time-step.
I0 stands for the number of consumers who make up the
residual demand. γi indicates the peak demand of the ith user.
Ω represents the residual demand of the system, which is an
input of our simulator and is held constant throughout the en-
tire simulation process. Finally, Ξn represents the aggregated
apparent consumption of the agents in I, which is computed
according to eq. (29).
∀n ∈ N Ξn =
I∑
i=1
ξi,n (29)
with ξi,n being the apparent consumption of every user in set
I. This variable is given by a different expression depend-
ing on the choice of environment and, in particular, on the
compensation mechanism in place. ∀ (i, n) ∈ I ×N :
ξi,n =
{
max
{
0,
(
ρ
(−)
i,n − ρ(+)i,n
)}
if NM,
ρ
(−)
i,n if NB
(30)
where ρ(−)i,n and ρ
(+)
i,n are, respectively, the imports and exports
of the ith prosumer at the nth time-step, outputs of the MILP
(for n = 0, ρ(−)i,n is the yearly demand and ρ
(+)
i,n = 0.
Once the simulation starts, at every time-step n, some
potential prosumers may turn into actual prosumers, impacting
the revenues of the DSO and, in particular, Ξn and γi. The
DSO, in turn, reacts by updating the different components of
the distribution tariff, according to the following expressions:
∀n ∈ N Π(vol)n+1 =
[
Θn + ∆n
Ω + Ξn
]
· µ1 (31)
∀n ∈ N Π(cap)n+1 =
[
Θn + ∆n∑(I+I0)
i=0 γi
]
· µ2 (32)
∀n ∈ N Π(fix)n+1 =
[
Θn + ∆n
I + I0
]
· µ3 (33)
where µ1, µ2, and µ3 represent the share of the volumetric,
capacity, and fixed fee, respectively, imposed by the environ-
ment. These shares comply with
∑3
j=1 µj = 1. Furthermore,
the imbalance from the previous period is introduced with the
difference ∆n = Θn −Rn.
IV. SIMULATOR BENCHMARKING
To illustrate the simulator, we present an extensive battery
of tests showcasing how our methodology can lead to various
DN evolutions, depending on the regulatory framework in
force. The simulator requires a set of potential prosumers I
TABLE I
ENVIRONMENTS TO EVALUATE DIFFERENT TARIFF DESIGNS (E1 - E7)
AND DIFFERENT INCENTIVE MECHANISMS (E8 - E17)
Test Environment µ1 µ2 µ3 NM NB Π(sp)
Te
st
A
vol4 1 0 0 - X 0.04e
cap 0 1 0 - X 0.04e
fixed 0 0 1 - X 0.04e
vol_cap 1/2 1/2 0 - X 0.04e
vol_fixed 1/2 0 1/2 - X 0.04e
cap_fixed 0 1/2 1/2 - X 0.04e
equal_weight 1/3 1/3 1/3 - X 0.04e
Te
st
B
nm 1 0 0 X - -
vol4 1 0 0 - X 0.04e
vol5 1 0 0 - X 0.05e
vol6 1 0 0 - X 0.06e
vol7 1 0 0 - X 0.07e
vol8 1 0 0 - X 0.08e
vol9 1 0 0 - X 0.09e
vol10 1 0 0 - X 0.10e
vol11 1 0 0 - X 0.11e
vol12 1 0 0 - X 0.12e
TABLE II
GENERAL INPUTS OF THE MULTI-AGENT MODEL.
Parameter Value Units
P (pv)* 1500 [e/kWp]
P (bat)* 300 [e/kWh]
Π
(ot)
n 0.132 [e/kWh]
η(−) 0.95 [%]
η(+) 0.95 [%]
F (−) 2.5 [-]
F (+) 4 [-]
B 8 [years]
p¯ 10 [kWp]
b¯ 30 [kWh]
α 1 [-]
Y 20 [years]
r 0.02 [%]
Ω 85% of total load [kWh]
I 1000 [#]
* Prices at time n = 0, they evolve according
to the environment rules. See III-A.
as input; each of them is characterised by a demand profile
and a production profile. To generate demand profiles, we
use the CREST model [17], whereas to generate production
profiles we use the Python library PVLIB [18]. With these
users, we evaluate two families of environments. The first
family of environments (Test A) is generated by modifying
the values of µj (which are, in reality, set by the regulator),
thus altering the weight of the volumetric, capacity, or fixed
fees on the DSO’s remuneration mechanism (the compensation
mechanism of the prosumers is kept constant). The second
family of environments (Test B) is generated by selecting
different compensation mechanisms which will have an impact
on the behind-the-meter electricity bills (the values of µj are
kept constant). Table I summarises the environments and Table
II lists the used constants.
To evaluate each of the introduced environments, three
metrics are used: (i) the evolution of the distribution tariff,
(ii) the penetration of DER relative to the maximum potential
I , and (iii) the actual deployed PV and battery capacities (in
kWp and kWh). Since our methodology involves a probabilis-
tic decision-making process introduced in the IDP element
(Section III-E), five independent runs are carried out for
each environment. Thus, the shown results correspond to the
average run, where a confidence interval of 95% is provided
(shaded area around each line and error bars in the bar plots).
In addition, box plots of one single run, representing the users
variability, are introduced below with the following settings:
the whiskers are set to represent the 5th and 95th percentiles;
the box represents the first and third quartiles; the solid green
line is the median (second quartile); the dotted line represents
the mean; and the points are the outliers for the given box plot
features. In the following, we present the results and discussion
for Test A and Test B, independently.
A. Test A
1) Results: Fig. 2A shows the deployment of DER over
time as a percentage of the total potential I , and for various
environments with different values of µj (i.e. the importance
given to the volumetric, capacity, or fixed terms). Overall,
environments with capacity charges tend to produce sharp
trend lines with a high percentage of potential prosumers
turned into actual prosumers. On the other hand, applying a
fixed fee limits the proportion of potential prosumers who turn
into actual prosumers. Finally, environments with volumetric
fees fall somewhere in between the other two groups. Fig. 2B
displays the increase in the distribution tariff (in terms of costs
for a consumer) as a response to the deployed DER installa-
tions. Environments with fixed fees result in the least increase
in distribution tariff, followed by the ones with volumetric fees,
and finally by those where capacity fees are applied, which
result in the largest distribution tariff increase. Fig. 3A shows
the total installed capacity of PV and batteries, at the end
of the simulation horizon. Environments with volumetric fees
render the highest PV installation capacities; environments
with capacity fees result in larger battery capacities deployed;
finally, incorporating a fixed term in the distribution tariff tends
to reduce the capacities installed of PV and battery. In Fig. 3,
box plot representations of the deployed PV (Fig. 3B) and of
the deployed battery (Fig. 3C) are provided for the average
run; whilst the PV deployed is sized relatively uniformly, the
battery capacity features a more extreme behaviour, where
environments with capacity fees deploy considerably larger
(and uniform) batteries than the other environments.
2) Discussion: splitting the distribution costs into volumet-
ric, capacity, and fixed terms has a clear impact on both the
behaviour of the users and the revenue of the DSO. The high
rates of DER deployment with the full capacity environment
(cap) are only matched by the equally high increase in the
distribution tariff implied (Fig. 2B). This is explained by the
ability of the prosumers to adapt to the distribution tariff
shaving their peak demands γi by installing batteries (Fig. 3),
which is consistent with the results found in [19]. Regarding
the fully volumetric environment (vol4), it renders a lower
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an IC of 95% (shaded areas), for the environments in Test A.
vol4 cap fix vol_cap vol_fix cap_fix equal_weight
Environment
A)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
To
ta
l c
ap
ac
ity
PV [kWp]
BAT [kWh]
vol4 cap fix vol_cap vol_fix cap_fixequal_weight
Environment
B)
1
2
3
4
PV
 C
ap
ac
ity
 [k
W
p]
vol4 cap fix vol_cap vol_fix cap_fixequal_weight
Environment
C)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Ba
tte
ry
 C
ap
ac
ity
 [k
W
h]
Fig. 3. Total capacity of PV and battery deployed at the end of the simulation
horizon (A). Box plot of the deployed PV (B) and battery (C) in the typical
run. Results shown for environments in Test A.
DER penetration than the previous case, resulting in a lower
increase in distribution tariff (Fig. 2B), which is explained by
the positive apparent consumption of the prosumers (the DER
installation is not sufficient for the prosumers to be stand-
alone, who must partially rely on imports from the DN), as
further explained in [16]. As for the environment with a fully
fixed distribution fee (fixed), this tariff design does not
stimulate DER deployment since the distribution charges only
depend on the grid connection (not drawn energy or power).
Thus, the slight observed growth is explained by the reduced
energy imports of the actual prosumers, who, in turn, incur
lower energy costs, as well as the possibility of selling the
production surplus to the grid at a Π(sp) of 0.04e (Fig. 2,
Fig. 3, and Table I). Finally, the other environments, made
up with more than one term (volume, capacity, or fixed),
show an intermediate capacity and price evolution. There is
a clear trade-off between including a fixed term to ensure the
DSO recovery of costs, and fostering DER deployment by
means of capacity or volumetric tariff designs. We can see
that two-part tariff designs might not be sufficient to find the
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right balance, as stated in [12]; rather, finding a compromise
requires balancing all three terms.
B. Test B
1) Results: Fig. 4A shows the deployment of DER for each
of the environments (Table I). The trend is similar for the
environments with NB, describing a greater growth of DER
deployment as Π(sp) increases. The environment with NM
exhibits the largest proportion of actual prosumers at the end
of the simulation horizon, as well as the quickest growth. Fig.
4B represents the adjustment of the distribution tariff triggered
by the DER deployment (in particular by the reduced amount
of electricity imported from the DN). In this case, nm results
in the largest increase in distribution tariff. For any n, and for
environments with NB, a higher Π(sp) corresponds to a higher
proportion of prosumers. It is worth mentioning nonetheless,
that from Π(sp) = 0.09e on, the increase in electricity costs
at the end of the simulation period is lower than such increase
rendered with Π(sp) = 0.08e and below. Regarding Fig. 5,
it can be seen that the environment with NM does not result
in the deployment of batteries. In addition, the environments
with NB result in both PV and battery deployment. In these
environments, a large selling price (Π(sp)) elicits a large PV
capacity, and a reduced battery capacity. Such trends can also
be observed in the box plots (Figs. 5B and 5C).
2) Discussion: the different trends observed for NM and
NB are a consequence of the distinct behaviour they induce in
prosumers. NM does not seem to offer any incentive for the
prosumers to sell electricity or become self-sufficient. Instead,
this compensation mechanism creates conditions in which
it is beneficial for the prosumers to adjust their production
so that they can import and export equivalent amounts of
energy (ξi,n = 0). Consequently, the distribution tariff for
the environment with NM (nm in Fig. 4B), outgrows the
other nine environments (which use NB), since the apparent
consumption in nm is close to zero, and the DSO needs to
adjust the distribution tariff to a greater extent in contrast to the
environments with NB. We may also note that, under NM, no
batteries are deployed (Fig. 5). This corroborates the findings
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horizon (A). Box plot of the deployed PV (B) and battery (C) in the typical
run. Results shown for environments in Test B.
in [6], where the authors observed that, with NM, batteries
and exchanges with the grid are perfect substitutes. In the
environments with NB (vol4 - vol12), the prosumers tend to
deploy greater PV and battery capacity to reduce their imports.
Interestingly, when the selling price is beyond a threshold
(vol9 - vol12), the prosumers rely on selling electricity as
a business model, not reducing their apparent consumption to
the same extent as in the environments below such a threshold
(vol4 - vol8). Hence, the increase in the distribution tariff
(Fig. 4B) is more prominent in vol4 - vol8, than in vol9 -
vol12. A new trade-off appears between high selling prices
(feed-in-tariffs) and a distribution price spiral, where both
imply an extra burden for the community.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a methodology to evaluate how
electricity consumers, prosumers, and the distribution system
operator interact under arbitrary regulatory environments. In
particular, the developed methodology enables estimating the
evolution and extent of distributed generation deployment, and
how such a deployment impacts the evolution of the distribu-
tion tariff. Experiments illustrate how prosumers’ choices vary
from one regulatory framework to the other. This suggests
that it is valuable checking by simulation that a regulatory
framework allows for reaching what it is intended for (e.g.,
deployment of distributed electricity generation). This paper
has focused on the regulatory challenges induced by the
deployment of distributed generation, but future works may
include modelling physical constraints induced by the distribu-
tion network, such as over-voltages or new uses for electricity.
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